Why Mark Ritson has it wrong on Coles
This week, Mark Ritson wrote a piece for Mumbrella in which he argues that Coles may be slapped on the wrist by the ACCC, but it won’t impact its reputation among Australian shoppers. Craig Badings, partner and co-lead reputation practice at SenateSHJ, offers a rebuttal to Ritson’s argument.
Will Coles' reputation go down down?
In his recent Mumbrella column, Mark Ritson argues that the ACCC’s action against Coles over pricing is purely a legislative matter. Coles, he suggests, may face regulatory consequences, but there will be no meaningful reputational damage.
But reputation today rarely collapses overnight for major incumbents. It thins out. Quietly. Gradually. Then structurally. And when it does, the financial consequences are neither theoretical nor confined to communication metrics.
We know this because we track it.
The SenateSHJ Crisis Index 300 — the only global index analysing the financial impact of corporate crises across more than 300 listed companies on 27 stock exchanges — shows that when trust failures crystallise into full-blown crises, the consequences are severe and enduring.
On average:
- Share prices fall 35.2%
- Earnings per share decline 68.6%
- It takes 425 days – well over a year – for companies to recover to pre-crisis share price levels
- Nearly one in three companies never fully recover their pre-crisis market value.
The Coles matter is not in that category – yet. But that misses the point. For Coles, the danger isn’t immediate collapse. It’s cumulative reputation erosion.
Trust is behavioural, not rhetorical
Modern reputation is formed less by brand positioning and more by observed behaviour. Customers, regulators and investors don’t always assess single incidents in isolation. They aggregate incidents and patterns.
When shoppers begin to feel “managed or manipulated” rather than treated fairly – particularly during a cost-of-living crisis – each allegation becomes another data point. No single event may cause defection at scale. But over time, the pattern reshapes how the brand is judged.
And this judgment changes economics.
Supermarkets operate on thin margins but immense scale. They rely on customer habit, convenience, perceived value for money, assortment of stock and availability, and perceived fairness and integrity. The last two translate to a reputation and trust operating asset, and when this declines, several things happen:
- Customers become more price sensitive
- Competitors’ promotions become more effective
- Political scrutiny intensifies
- Regulators feel emboldened
- Activists gain traction
- Media framing hardens.
None of that shows up instantly in quarterly sales. But it shifts the long-term cost of doing business.
Reputation now flows into governance
Commercial controversies quickly become governance questions.
Pricing practices are not just operational decisions; they are interpreted as reflections of leadership intent and corporate culture. The shift from “what happened?” to “what does this say about who you are?” is where reputational damage becomes structural.
Investors increasingly treat brand trust as a proxy for governance quality. We have seen this play out repeatedly during AGM seasons, where remuneration votes and board elections become vehicles for expressing broader dissatisfaction about culture, transparency and leadership conduct.
In that environment, pricing allegations are not siloed within marketing. They are evaluated as signals about oversight, incentives and ethical trade-offs.
This sort of governance-linked reputation risk carries a financial premium.
Slow reputation erosion reduces resilience
The Crisis Index 300 data reveals something boards often underestimate: companies that enter a crisis with diminished trust suffer deeper and longer financial damage.
Reputation functions as a shock absorber. When trust is strong, stakeholders grant benefit of the doubt. Recovery is faster. Regulators show more procedural patience. Investors maintain confidence.
When trust is thin, the opposite occurs. Share price reactions are sharper. Media narratives are less forgiving. Recovery periods are longer.
A 425-day average recovery is not just a statistic – it represents extended capital constraint, management distraction and opportunity cost. A 68.6% EPS decline signals impaired profitability long after headlines fade.
The compounding effect is what matters.
If a brand like Coles experiences incremental trust erosion over time, its resilience in a future, unrelated crisis – supply chain failure, safety issue, cyber incident – will be materially lower. The pricing controversy may not be catastrophic. But it weakens the reputation buffer.
And weakened reputations are expensive. Echo Research reputation-value statistics show that in the UK, corporate reputation accounts for roughly 30% of total market capitalisation of FTSE 350 companies, equivalent to about £719 billion (A$1378b) in shareholder value in 2024.
Purpose under pressure
There is another dimension Ritson overlooks: narrative coherence.
Large retailers position themselves as supporting Australian households, backing communities and helping families manage cost pressures. When conduct appears misaligned with that positioning, the gap between promise and behaviour becomes corrosive.
Reputation damage is rarely about legal technicalities. It is about perceived fairness.
During periods of economic stress, fairness becomes a heightened societal trigger. Allegations that suggest asymmetry – particularly involving essential goods – amplify sensitivity. That doesn’t mean customers revolt overnight. It means memory accumulates.
Legislation can reset rules. It does not reset memory.
The real long-term risk
The most significant error in dismissing reputational damage is assuming reputation only matters if customers immediately defect.
Reputational erosion expresses itself in slower, more structural ways:
- Reduced pricing power over time
- Increased cost of regulatory compliance
- Greater scrutiny in future inquiries
- Higher governance risk weighting from institutional investors
- Lower tolerance during unrelated crises.
You rarely see its deterioration in a single quarter. You see it in gradually declining goodwill, sharper reactions to future missteps, and boards spending more time managing sentiment than shaping strategy.
The Coles situation may well result in legislative consequences. But to assume there will be no reputational dimension is to misinterpret how trust operates – particularly in essential-service categories during economic strain.
The long-term risk is not a headline collapse but rather the slow downgrade of trust and the compounding cost of operating without it.
These dynamics are explored in greater depth in SenateSHJ’s Future of Reputation 2030 report, based on interviews with 44 global reputation and corporate affairs leaders, which highlights how reputation has shifted from a communications output to a governance and enterprise-value determinant.
And that shift is precisely why this debate matters.


Have enjoyed both sides of this debate and see merit in both angles. Would love a follow-up piece on how Coles can rebuild after this reputational damage.
Great article, spot on.
Craig Badings makes a compelling academic argument. But it doesn’t hold up against basic reality.
1. Grocery prices aren’t even the biggest pain point
Australians are getting smashed on energy, rent and insurance. Grocery pricing is annoying, it’s not existential. The reputational catastrophe thesis assumes groceries sit at the top of people’s minds. They don’t. Not having a roof over your head or being able to keep the lights on are way bigger priorities.
2. Where are people supposed to go?
Coles and Woolworths own roughly two-thirds of the market. The “damaged reputation leads to customer defection” argument only works when real alternatives exist. For most Australians, they don’t. Switching supermarkets isn’t a political statement, it’s a big logistical inconvenience most simply won’t bother with. Legislation can change pricing rules. It won’t change the proximity of supermarkets near your house.
3. The thin margins defence is doing two contradictory jobs
Badings argues that because supermarkets run on thin margins, trust is their critical operating asset: the very thing holding the whole machine together. But Coles’ gross margin is 26.6%. The 2.4% net margin comes after $44.5 billion in revenue has been filtered through wages, leases and logistics. So the thin margin framing is technically true and strategically misleading at the same time. You can’t argue Coles is a lean, margin-pressured business while it books $1.08 billion in annual profit from a captive customer base. The thin margin argument generates sympathy and implies vulnerability. But the actual numbers describe a business that is structurally protected, not structurally exposed.
4. His trust argument assumes a competitive market that doesn’t exist
Yes, trust functions as a behavioural asset. But trust only matters economically when it can be withdrawn: when there are alternatives. In a genuine market, eroding trust triggers defection, defection triggers revenue loss, and revenue loss produces the financial damage his Crisis Index 300 describes. That chain only works if step two is possible. In Australia’s grocery duopoly, it isn’t. Woolworths is under identical ACCC scrutiny for identical behaviour for goodness sake, going to trial on April 20, 2026.
Ritson 1 Badings 0
Whilst this makes for an interesting read and probably even better meeting room Powerpoint, it doesn’t address the reality of the fact that the average Australian has to put some groceries on the table. And dollar or two here is not top of mind compared to all the inflationary factors and lack of real choices in their lives, no matter how compelling a global framework appears.
Speaking from my own personal experience, I doubt very much that either Woolworths or Coles would ever be concerned about reputational damage in the slightest.
For the most part, the supermarket that gets my business is the one which is closest to my home, has the easiest access or happens to be the one that I pass on my commute.
love a sample size of n=1. it must be true.
they will care about it big time when it impacts profitability … if Aldi / IGA / a new competitor ever starts to do a better job of repositioning the “oligopoly 2” as the bad guys