No, Boeing, an ‘abundance of caution’ is not good enough
For a major aircraft manufacturer, there should be a very clear and well-rehearsed crisis communication plan. Tony Jaques explains where Boeing went wrong in this crossposting from his Managing Outcomes newsletter.
In the wake of a major disaster, words matter. And for Boeing to say it grounded the troubled 737 Max8 aircraft in “an abundance of caution” was a particularly unhelpful choice of words.
Within just five months, two of the new aircraft crashed minutes after take-off – in Indonesia and Ethiopia – killing a total of 346 passengers and crew.
Let’s be frank.
The time for caution is before sale, when Boeing decided to make important safety features paid extras.
All of this is a side issue. The REAL issue is the use of software in critical areas, and furthermore, that “software” being able to override the pilot’s command of the aircraft. Yes, there have been many crashes caused by hydraulic and manual control cable problems, but these are MUCH easier to inspect and detect than millions of lines of arcane (and non open source) code. The previous generation of planes were forged in the fires of war, and frequently hobbled back with half their tails shot off and riddled with bullet holes. However, these new plastic planes run by impossible-to-fully-test software and systems are a catastrophe waiting to happen. As there has been no proper long term testing of the plastic parts, I am also expecting more instances of “sudden and catastrophic de-lamination” as those airframes approach the 5 to 6 year mark. You can “blue print” and x-ray traditional aluminium parts to detect incipient fractures, but there is no equivalent for the new plastic bits, or to properly test for all failure modes of software (or electronics). Let’s also not forget about the undocumented facilities now incorporated in many chip designs which the software designers are totally unaware of. The Intel Management Engine debacle (which allowed unfettered access to bad actors) illustrates just how little control the final manufacturer has of the parts they might use. I won’t even mention the stories about a certain large asian manufacturing country installing hardware back doors in their chips (and govts banning their use in telco industry). Nobody has *any* clear idea of the whole chain of events of any of those electronic death trap systems. Yes, as a veteran software developer (who has seen it all) and private pilot, I am quite scared to set foot on a “modern” aircraft.